exempting nonprofit hospitals, the current university endowment debate, and a hodgepodge of rulings relating to what I will call "middle class charity" in which the IRS has denied exemption to nonprofit organizations providing services to the middle class (as opposed to the poor). Part I provides a brief introduction to the history of the redistribution concept in federal exemption under 501(c)(3) prior to the current regulations introduced in 1959. Part II then provides a summary of current law and proposals in the three areas described above (nonprofit hospitals, programs aimed at the middle class, and university endowments). Part III then turns to some analysis and observations. The main observations are (1) that the redistributive push in the areas identified by this paper is almost certainly bad policy and inconsistent with the IRS's supposed adoption of the broad common-law view of charity in the 1959 regulations; (2) that the redistributive paradigm seems to pop up most in areas where the organizations in question carry on activities that look very similar to commercial enterprises -in other words, what we may be seeing is the use of the redistribution paradigm to help distinguish charitable services from ordinary for-profit business; (3) limiting the definition of charitable for tax exemption purposes to relief of the poor is inconsistent with the historical definition of charity; and (4) the effort to limit the scope of tax exemption/deductibility to redistribution to the poor is inconsistent with virtually all the theories proposed to explain tax exemption and essentially adopts one particular view of distributive justice that may not be appropriate in formulating tax benefits for charities.
Until tax policy chooses an underlying rationale for charitable tax exemption, however, the inconsistencies in applying exemption are likely to continue.
I. History: The IRS Redistributive View of Charity Prior to 1959
Though it may seem hard to believe from the vantage point of the early 21st century, at one time the IRS seemed to view relief of the poor as the only rationale for exemption for organizations that fell outside those specifically enumerated (e.g., religious
and educational) in what is now Code Section 501(c)(3). In 1923, the IRS ruled that a civic association whose purpose was to promote "a higher civic and social life" though camps, clubs and classes was not exempt because the word "charitable" as used in the existing exemption provision was limited to "relief of the poor" and not the broader charitable trust definition which encompassed virtually any benefit to a broad charitable class. 10 Though the Service recognized the broader meaning of "charitable" in the common law, it concluded that because Congress specifically listed certain charitable organizations (e.g., religious, educational) that would have been included in a broad reading of the word "charitable," Congress must have meant to limit "charitable" in the statute to its more "common" meaning of relief of the poor. would have retained the view that "charitable" was limited to relief of the poor.
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It was not until 1959 that the IRS officially reversed course and adopted new regulations under 501(c)(3) that embraced the broad common-law view of charity. In this new regulation, the IRS stated that "charitable" in the statue was used in its "generally accepted legal sense," and included:
Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to 10 I.T. 1800, II-2 Cum. Bull. 152 (1923) . Historically, relief of the poor has been viewed as a charitable purpose at least since the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses enacted by the English Parliament in 1601. The preamble to that statute, which is generally viewed as the "headwaters" of charitable trust law, listed "relief of aged, impotent and poor people" as an appropriate charitable purpose. See AT LARGE 43 (Eng. 1763). The preamble, however, also listed a number of other public purposes that were considered charitable that were not directly connected to poor relief; see text and notes at notes 101-102_, infra. 11 Treas. Reg. 111, §29.101(6)-1(a) (1943) . 12 Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(b), 21 Fed. Reg. 460, 463. defend human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency. 13 As the material below indicates, however, relief of the poor is still used in many contexts as the main indicator of charitable purpose, and has become a tax policy rallying point with respect to nonprofit hospitals and university endowments.
II.
Examples organization not within one of the specified exemption categories in 501(c)(3) and its predecessors had to be engaged in "relief of the poor" to be charitable. Health by promoting health care for a broad cross-section of the community. 31 In short, the Tax Court continued to apply the "community benefit" standard articulated in Rev.
Rul. 69-545 in its broadest sense, despite IRS arguments focusing on the lack of charity care and the method of delivery of services (contract model vs. staff model).
On appeal, however, the Third Circuit reversed. The court found that the Tax Court had too liberally applied the community benefit standard, and bought the IRS arguments that Geisinger's lack of charity care, as-yet unrealized treatment of Medicaid patients and use of the contract model meant that Geisinger was "primarily benefitting itself" rather than the general community. 32 This reversal by the Third Circuit was especially significant in that the court refused to accept the Tax Court's view that "promotion of health" for the general community essentially meant delivery of medical services to a broad cross-section of the population. Instead, the Third Circuit appeared to want evidence of something more than simply the providing of medical services to paying patients, and one of the key aspects of "more" was a substantial charity care program.
More evidence of the IRS's return to a charity care emphasis in health care exemption cases came as a result of the accelerating trend for vertical integration in health care delivery in the late 1980's and early 1990's. In a series of rulings dealing with integrated delivery systems (IDS's), the IRS considered how to apply the community benefit standard to the parent corporation of these integrated providers. 33 In each case, it on in question met the general requirements of Rev. Rul. 69-was clear that the organizati 31 Id. at 3217. 32 Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm'r, 985 F.2d 1210, 1219-20 (3d Cir. 1993). 33 In general, an IDS consisted of a parent corporation and several corporate subsidiaries. In general, these integrated systems directly operated acute-care hospitals, outpatient clinics, and specialty health services such as psychiatric clinics, and either employed staff physicians on salary or contracted with a physician group practice to provide services and paid them on a capitated basis. 37 Thus in all these rulings, the IRS followed a consistent analysis: the mere fact that these entities clearly were providing health care services to a broad cross-section of paying patients (including participation in Medicaid programs) was insufficient to support exempt status; more (and the most-cited "more" was some significant charity care commitment) was required.
The not-so-slow transition of the community benefit standard from "health care for the general benefit of the community" to "health care for the general benefit of the community plus something else, preferably significant charity care" became complete at the turn of the century with a series of cases dealing once again with the exempt status of HMO's. The cases involved three subsidiary corporations in the Intermountain Health Care system, each of which had been formed to conduct an HMO business in IHC's service area. 38 While each of these cases also dealt with whether the HMO subsidiaries 34 Id. 35 The Friendly Hills ruling noted that Friendly Hills had agreed to provide free or discounted follow-up care to any charity patient admitted for emergency treatment; in the Facey and Harriman Jones rulings, the IDS committed to a specific level of charity care per year for a set time period ($400,000 in Facey; $750,000 in Harriman Jones In the companion IHC Care decision, the language was similar:
Against this backdrop, we further note that, unlike the HMO in Sound Health Association v. Commissioner, supra, petitioner did not own or operate its own medical facilities, nor did petitioner employ its own physicians. Consequently, petitioner could not provide free medical care to those otherwise unable to pay for medical services. Additionally, petitioner did not establish a subsidized premiums program, conduct research, or offer free education programs to the public. Petitioner's Core Wellness Program was offered exclusively to its enrollees.
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These cases were a watershed of sorts, because they represented the first time that the Tax Court agreed with the IRS position that simply providing health services for pay to the general community was insufficient to support exemption; rather some "plus," such as charity care, education or research programs, was required. Moreover, this "promotion of health plus" standard was embraced on appeal by the 10th Circuit. 41 In its discussion of the community benefit test, the court stated plainly that "an organization cannot satisfy the community benefit requirement based solely on the fact that it offers health-care services to all in the community in exchange for a fee. . . . Rather, the organization must provide some additional 'plus.'" 42 First on the list of these "pluses" was "free or belowcost services," though the court acknowledged that "devoting surpluses to research, education and medical training" might also suffice, and that treatment of Medicare/Medicaid patients was a virtual requirement.
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Despite the 10th Circuit 's suggestion that something other than charity care could satisfy the community benefit requirements, one suspects that in cases other than community-based acute-care hospitals, significant charity care will be required for exemption. Indeed, in its 2002 textbook advising field agents on issues relating to tax exemption, the two examples the IRS gave of health care organizations other than acutecare hospitals that qualified for exemption were an organization that provided free medical screening to uninsured inner-city residents and an organization that provided free dental care to children from low-income families.
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The return of charity care as a sine-qua-non of exemption for health care providers continues today at both the federal administrative and legislative levels. On the administrative front, the new Schedule H to Form 990 clearly emphasizes the role of charity care in defining "community benefit." For example, Part I of the schedule is titled "Charity Care and Certain Other Community Benefits," and the first six questions deal with hospitals' charity care policies. 45 The instructions to the new form similarly emphasize charity care's prominent role in the community benefit standard. Despite the IRS's shift in 1959 from a redistributive view of the word "charitable"
to a broad common-law view emphasizing "community benefit," services specifically aimed at the "middle class" have been curiously off-limits for purposes of federal tax exemption even though they often display rather clear benefits to the general community served. For example, in Rev. Rul. 70-585, 49 the IRS examined three cases in which nonprofit organizations were formed to construct housing. In Situation 1 in the ruling, the organization in question built new housing and renovated existing housing for sale at below-market mortgage rates and terms to low-income families who could not otherwise secure financing. In Situation 2, the organization constructed housing for sale to "low and moderate income" minority families in an area that was racially segregated, apparently from "local discrimination" (according to the ruling). In Situation 3, an organization was formed to rehabilitate housing units in a city area where median income was "lower than in other sections of the city" and the housing was "generally old and deteriorated." The ost to "low and moderate" income individuals. In Situation housing would be rented at c 47 4, an organization building new housing aimed specifically at moderate income families in a neighborhood where land values and housing prices had essentially "frozen out" moderate income individuals. Again, the proposal was to rent the units at cost.
In all the cases in the ruling, the organizations in question obtained funding from federal and state housing programs as well as private contributions. Nevertheless, the IRS found that the groups in Situations 1-3 qualified for exemption, while the group in Situation 4 did not. According to the IRS, the purpose of the group in Situation 4 was not charitable, because its program "is not designed to provide relief to the poor or to carry out any other charitable purpose within the meaning of the regulations . . ."
The resistance to classifying services aimed at the middle class also is evident from rulings related to legal assistance and disaster relief. In Rev. Rul. 69-161, 50 the IRS recognized that providing legal services to the poor would qualify as a charitable purpose, and in Rev. Rul. 78-428, 51 amplified the earlier ruling to make clear that charging a fee based on ability to pay would not disqualify an organization whose services were aimed at the poor. But exemption for legal services to persons other than the poor is extremely limited -the Service has approved exemption for "public interest law firms" that undertake cases in the public interest (e.g., "test" cases in broad public interest areas such as the first amendment, government regulation, etc.) but only under a very strict set of guidelines that emphasizes the lack of commercial viability for the cases (e.g., private law firms would be unlikely to be engaged by litigants or otherwise take the case). 53 FISHMAN AND SCHWARZ, supra note 9, Teachers Manual at 67 (opining that an organization formed to provide legal services to the middle class at cost "is unlikely to make the grade, despite the altruism of its founders and their adherence to the nondistribution constraint, because it is essentially providing a commercial service in competition with small law firms and sole practitioners.").
On the disaster relief front, the IRS has struggled to define the appropriate bounds of charity. Disaster relief has long been recognized as a charitable purpose, 54 but after the Oklahoma City bombing and again after the 9/11 attacks, questions arose about the ability of charities to make economic grants (in the form of cash or property) to individuals who have suffered from a disaster, particularly if such grants were not to those traditionally classified as "poor" or under some other specific financial need. 55 At one point, the IRS had suggested that such grants might violate the private benefit doctrine, stating in a letter to Oklahoma City charities after the bombing there that although one did not have to be "poor" to be eligible for disaster relief, "an outright transfer of funds based solely on an individual's involvement in a disaster or without regard to meeting the individual's particular distress or financial needs would result in excessive private benefit." 56 After the 9/11 attacks, however, the IRS issued Notice 2001-78 stating that it would treat payments made by charities to disaster victims and their families as related to the charity's exempt purpose as long as such grants were made "in good faith using objective standards." 57 Nevertheless, the private benefit issue raised enough concern that after 9/11, Congress enacted legislation that specifically provided that cash grants to 9/11 victims would be considered as made for an exempt purpose, essentially removing the private benefit analysis from payments made for 9/11 disaster relief. 58 The current IRS position on disaster relief, however, appears to have returned to the proposition that the charity must make some kind of "needs" assessment when appropriate and to document the basis for its grants. the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected exemption for an organization formed to sell drugs to the elderly or handicapped at cost (note, not specifically the poor) on the grounds that the pharmacy was simply engaged in a commercial service. In the environmental preservation area, the IRS has resisted exemption for organizations that preserve farmland as working farms, arguing that the land involved had no particular "ecological significance" and that commercial farming is not an exempt purpose.
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Exemption for health/recreation facilities similarly seems keyed to whether the organization seeking exemption insures that whatever fees they impose do not "price out" significant segments of the community.
62
In any event, these cases overall signal that the IRS is less than completely dedicated to the broad definition of charity set forth in the 1959 regulations, and that relief of the poor is a significant, if not controlling, factor in some areas of exemption law.
C. Educational Institutions and Endowments
The current pressure on universities to spend more of their endowments appears to Productivity. In her testimony, Munson targeted the billion-dollar plus endowments of many elite universities (though she also specifically noted "little 1500-student Grinnell
College") and what she characterized as "miserly" payouts. 66 She noted that the endowments of the top 25 colleges and universities exceeded those of the 25 largest private foundations, and that if gasoline and milk prices had increased as much as college tuition since 1980, they would cost $9.15 and $15 per gallon, respectively.
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Shortly after the 2007 hearing, Grassley issued a press release excoriating colleges and universities for their tuition hikes in light of their large endowments and investment returns, and suggested that he would pursue a mandatory pay-out requirement for large university endowments similar to that imposed on private foundations. 68 He followed his press release with a letter, co-signed by new Finance Chair Max Baucus, that requested information on endowments, tuition and endowment spending from 136 of the wealthiest colleges and universities. 69 Some major universities were quick to take the hint. Not long after Grassley's press release and letter, Harvard, Yale, Stanford and others announced programs to dramatically increase student financial aid. 70 While the recent economic downturn and stock market decline has muted further calls from Grassley for mandatory payouts, 71 scrutiny of university endowments will surely continue. If nothing else, the skyward trek of tuition at top institutions, and the inevitable rebound in investments will keep this issue in the sights of policy makers.
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III. The Redistributive Model in Federal Tax Exemption: Analysis
A. Bad Policy; Inconsistent Policy.
The threads of redistributive policy set forth in Part II of this paper appear to be both contrary to the traditional, broad view of charity at common law that the IRS purported to adopt in the 1959 regulations, at odds with other areas of exemption that clearly do not require any redistributive bent, and at the same time incredibly bad overall policy.
Take, for example, the push to impose a strict charity care standard for exemption of nonprofit hospitals. While one certainly can appreciate the need for more health services for the uninsured poor in a country where estimates put the number of uninsured at roughly 47 million people, 73 this effort stands in curious contrast to dozens of other poor relief is required. The IRS does not appear interested cases of exemption where no in knowing how many homeless people the Metropolitan Opera admits to its performances each year or that pass through the doors of the Museum of Modern Art.
Religious organizations are not required to file a "Schedule R" to form 990 detailing their expenditures on behalf of the poor, in contrast to the new Schedule H demanded of nonprofit hospitals. 74 Thus if one believes the IRS's statement in Rev. Rul. 69-545 that providing health care for the benefit of the general community is a charitable purpose at common law, the push to re-impose a charity care standard seems curiously at odds with the IRS's stated adherence to common-law standards of charity and the requirements for exemption in other areas.
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It is also undoubtedly bad health policy. As I have detailed numerous times in the past, 76 imposing a strict charity care standard for exemption of nonprofit hospitals will almost certainly push those hospitals toward providing the required amount of charity care
(and not a penny more) at the expense of other unprofitable health care services (e.g., a burn unit; emergency psychiatric care) that at least some empirical evidence suggests are more likely to be offered by nonprofits. 77 While I have heavily criticized the current community benefit formulation for hospital exemption as far too broad 78 and certainly have no argument with better accountability for exempt hospitals, it is curious that the law seems relatively unconcerned about accountability in so many other exemption cases.
The same general observations are true of the other two areas detailed in Part II.
rdable legal services to the middle class are not eligible for Organizations providing affo 74 "Churches" (a subset of the broader "religious organization" category of 501(c)(3)), of course, are not required to file form 990 at all. 75 One might argue that this difference in treatment results from the fact that religious and educational organizations are specifically named in 501(c)(3) as exempt, whereas hospitals are not. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has made clear that the enumeration of certain kinds of groups (e.g., religious, educational, scientific) does not create a per-se right to exemption, and that in all cases, and organization must prove it meets the common-law standards of charity in order to qualify for exemption. Bob Jones University v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Thus whatever standard the IRS chooses to apply to determine whether an organization is charitable should be the same for religious organizations as for nonprofit hospitals. 76 exemption, but "public interest law firms" appear to have no redistributive limits. One cannot qualify for exemption if the purpose is to build affordable middle-class housing in the Hamptons, but offering symphony performances in well-heeled surroundings in New York's upper-west-side is perfectly OK. "Environmental protection" writ large appears to be a valid charitable purpose, but not if the subject is preservation of farmland.
Meanwhile, the push to require universities with large endowments to spend more annually or limit their tax benefits would appear to be a particularly hare-brained implementation of redistributive policy. While it is true that Senator Grassley's saberrattling over endowments led to a few highly-publicized cases of wealthy universities providing increased student financial aid, 79 anyone with even the slightest familiarity with things financial should understand that money is fungible, and requiring universities to "spend more" will not necessarily mean that the spending will reduce tuition over the long run or provide greater opportunities for low and middle-income students; the increased spending could easily wind up in higher faculty or administrator salaries or new/remodeled buildings and capital equipment. 80 Similarly, reducing the tax benefits to such universities simply invites them to ratchet up tuition to make up the difference, hardly a well-aimed redistributive policy.
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There is a legitimate debate concerning current spending from charitable endowments, but that debate has little to do with redistribution to a specific segment of Michael Klausner and Henry Hansmann have pointed out, the current society. Rather, as 79 See note 70, supra. 80 See Waldeck, supra note 2 at 1815-1816 ("Advocates of a mandatory spending rule assume that the increased endowment spending would decrease tuition; that is, an endowment would bear some of the costs that are currently borne by students. Contrary to this assumption, however, a mandatory spending rule could have the unintentional effect of raising tuition across the board. "). Waldeck notes that a mandatory increase in endowment spending could lead to riskier investments as universities try to maintain overall endowment levels and growth, and could also lead to an increase in the "arms race" over facilities and equipment, rather than reduce tuition. 81 Of course, the other side of this argument is that current educational tax benefits aimed at students or their parents, such as the HOPE tax credit, simply invite colleges and universities to raise tuition so that the net cost to the student, after accounting for the benefit, remains constant. See Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687, 709 (1999) ("Moreover, institutions of higher education can capture the benefit by raising tuition or by offsetting internal financial aid (or both).").
key part of the endowment spending debate involves questions of inter-generational costeffectiveness and the issue of inter-generational equity. 82 On the cost-effectiveness front, Klausner notes that the relevant considerations are (1) how great a return to society a current expenditure creates versus a future expenditure, and (2) whether the future generations are expected to be wealthier or poorer overall than the current generation.
83
If a current expenditure would produce a compound return to society greater than the expected financial return on the endowment's investments, spending now should be preferred. Similarly, if future generations are expected to be wealthier than the current generation overall, delaying spending to future generations is in effect a transfer of wealth from a poorer generation (the current one) to a wealthier generation in the future, which presumably would be a bad policy choice. On the intergenerational equity front, Klausner notes (like Hansmann, below) that "equity" is not the same as "efficiency" -rather, the equity question is essentially an ethical one, centered around whether the current generation should be asked to sacrifice, even if that sacrifice would produce net gains in the future.
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In the university context, Henry Hansmann has argued strongly that deferring current spending in favor of future spending is irrational from a number of perspectives.
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If personal wealth continues to grow, future students can be expected to be more wealthy than current students; hence the decision by a university to save instead of spend results in a transfer from a poorer generation (the current one) to a future generation. 88 Waldeck, supra note 2, at 1806. 89 For those of you who never read comic books or watched 1960's era cartoons, try this link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scrooge_McDuck. A search of YouTube might also be helpful. Waldeck does not agree, however, that a mandatory spending rule (e.g., a 5% spending requirement a la private foundations) is the best solution to the problem -in fact, she worries that such a rule will actually end up exacerbating the problems with spiraling tuition. Instead, Waldeck prefers changes to tax policies targeted at donors, such as a rule that to qualify for a deduction, a charitable gift must be spent within a certain time frame -say, 25 years. While Waldeck acknowledges that such a rule is unlikely to completely overcome the other non-tax incentives for making endowment gifts, she argues that it would turn some significant number of donors toward current spending and might help change the "edifice" culture of major university donors. Waldec, supra note 2, at 1818-22. See also, Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873 (1997).
redistribution among members of the current generation. Moreover, if wealth redistribution among members of the current generation is the goal, the current proposals are woefully inadequate to address that goal. In fact, if redistribution among members of the current generation is the goal, one could argue that the best policy would be to encourage universities to charge the maximum tuition possible to students (and parents) that can afford it and couple that with some sort of "sliding scale" financial aid (perhaps similar, though more expansive, to the kinds of formulas used by some nonprofit hospitals to determine charity care eligibility) for students below the "sticker price" income level.
B. A Back-handed Commerciality Test?
Despite the above critique of the policy rationales for the redistributionist theme in federal tax exemption, there is an explanation of these "anomalies" that may make some sense, at least from a practical standpoint, if not a theoretical one. This explanation is that the redistributive notion appears to come to the forefront of exemption law when the entities in question start to more heavily resemble for-profit businesses than "traditional" charities in their operations. The push for a strict charity care standard for exemption of nonprofit hospitals has followed the transformation of nonprofit hospitals from what were essentially homeless shelters to fee-for-service enterprises as concerned (or more concerned) about the bottom line than service to the poor. 90 As nonprofit hospitals began to more closely resemble the operational philosophy of Intel, it has become harder for these organizations to demonstrate their differences from for-profit counterparts that annually pay millions in income and property taxes. Accordingly, courts and policymakers have increasingly turned to measuring whether hospitals provide free services to the poor as the key criterion for "charitableness." . 91 This trend has been especially noticeable at the state level. In 1985, the Utah state supreme court upheld the revocation of tax exemption for two nonprofit hospitals run by Intermountain Health Care (created as a non-denominational health care spin-off by the Church of Latter Day Saints) on the grounds that "charity" requires some identifiable "gift to the community" such as free care for the poor. Utah County v.
This same commerciality thread can be seen in the cases dealing with middle-class services. As noted above, the Eighth Circuit in Federated Pharmacy Services based its denial of exemption on the fact that the pharmacy in question was merely a commercial enterprise, though sales at cost are not usually a feature of commercial businesses 92 and the IRS attacked farm preservation as nothing more than preserving a commercial enterprise.
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Certain YMCA's are beginning to resemble upscale for-profit health clubs, and an organization whose purpose is to build "moderate income" housing looks an awful lot like a regular real-estate developer (though again one can certainly argue that providing such housing "at cost" differentiates such an organization from a commercial business).
The attack on university endowments also can be seen as an expression of frustration with the dividing line between commercial activities and charitable ones. Part of Senator Grassley's mantra concerning university endowments was the ever-increasing cost of higher education for students, and tuition constitutes 70% of the revenue for virtually all private colleges and universities and nearly half even for public institutions. 96 A quick Google search on "university research park" found over 50 listings. The web page for the research park at my home institution, the University of Illinois, unabashedly touts the research park as "an environment where technology-based businesses can work with the research faculty and students at UIUC to take advantage of opportunities for collaborative research and easy access to University labs, equipment, and services." successful minor leagues for the NBA and NFL. 97 In many respects, universities appear to some as headed toward the same Rubicon as nonprofit hospitals, where the difference between "charity" and "business" increasingly blurs. 98 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that policy makers have begun to fixate on some concrete measure of charity (in this case, using endowment funds to reduce tuition cost) that is similar to the "charity care" debate surrounding nonprofit hospitals.
Finally, the recent action by the English Charity Commission to deny charitable status to private schools that failed to provide enough scholarships for those unable to pay also tracks this commerciality analysis. In essence, the Commission's view is that simply providing services for a fee is not itself a public benefit, a view that tracks the IRS's tortured journey through hospital tax exemption outlined in Part II above.
In short, my explanation for the resurgence of the redistributive model of charity is that this emphasis has paralleled the commercialization of charitable enterprises. When churches have their own record labels and amusement parks, 99 one is perhaps less inclined to accept the "charitable" label on its face, and demand more evidence of traditional charitable activity as a precondition to exemption -helping the poor, for example.
C.
The Redistribution Bent, Historical Perspectives, and Theory
History
Whatever the explanation may be, the current fascination by some commentators with defining charity as almost exclusively associated with helping the poor is contrary to the historical definitions of charity and conflicts with all the theories on the On the historical front, while relief of the poor certainly has been a major part of the definition of charity for centuries, it has never been the only part. Indeed, taxexemption for charitable organizations originally had nothing at all to do with redistribution to the poor. Rather, the practice can be traced to the simple proposition that human beings shouldn't try to tax God: churches were the original tax-exempt entities. 100 Exemption for educational institutions was simply an extension of the religious exemption, since virtually all schools prior to the Reformation were church-affiliated. The 1601 Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses certainly highlighted the relief of the poor as a charitable purpose (and was passed as part of the "poor laws" enacted at that time 101 ), but also includes "schools of learning, free schools and scholars in universities," as well as 100 See COLOMBO AND HALL, supra note 8, at 3 ("one historian reports that the "economic equilibrium of the state was endangered" by the fact that the tax exempt temples owned fifteen percent of the cultivable land and vast amounts of slaves and other personal property during the reign of Ramses III about 1200 B.C. Restatement Third of the Law of Trusts is shorter and more opaque: "A trust purpose is charitable if its accomplishment is of such social interest or benefit to the community as to justify permitting the property to be devoted to the purpose in perpetuity and to justify the various other special privileges that are typically allowed to charitable trusts." 105 Like
English law, neither of these formulations restrict charity to help for the poor.
Of course, tax law need not be (and perhaps should not be) consistent with the ition of charity. historical common-law defin 106 In fact, I have argued in the past that tying tax-exemption to a body of law that primarily defines when a trust will not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities is more than a bit silly. 107 Nevertheless, to the extent that the IRS purports to adopt the common law definition as controlling for tax purposes, that definition clearly encompasses far more than relief of the poor.
Theory
If one does accept the notion that the definition of charity for tax exemption purposes should not or need not completely track the historical common-law definition, then perhaps a better viewpoint would be to turn to the theoretical basis for exemption and see how well a restricted definition of charity works in that light. Unfortunately, one the continuing problems with federal tax exemption law is that there is no accepted theory for why exemption exists; exemption in the federal income tax law did not result from a reasoned debate about the theoretical need for exemption, but rather simply adopted historical practice without much thought. Beginning about 1980, however, scholars began to offer differing theoretical explanations for exemption that either tracked, or more often constricted, the common-law definition. At last count, these scholars had offered at least ten different theoretical explanations for exemption.
Despite this lack of theoretical consensus, what we can observe that is important for these purposes is that a conception of charity limited to relief for the poor runs counter to literally all of the theoretical explanations that have surfaced for tax exemption. While each takes a somewhat different overall approach, a common theme of all these theories is that charities supply some sort of good or service or "way of doing things" that is not replicated in the private market or by government -some kind of public good or quasipublic good that otherwise would not exist. Tax-exemption in turn supplies an economic incentive for the production of whatever "thing" it is that is not being provided by the private market or government. The "thing" supplied might be a specific item not available from the private market (e.g., symphonic music) or something as diffuse as a "nonprofit ethic" that takes a different (and presumably unique) approach to providing something that might otherwise be available in the market -for example, a nonprofit hospital might approach patient care in a different manner than a for-profit one, even though the services provided (e.g., a heart by-pass) are ultimately the same.
So, for example, the classic "quid-pro-quo" theory of exemption posits that tax exemption is a rough "quid-pro-quo" to charities for doing things that otherwise would become the burden of (and paid for by) government. 108 The "community benefit" theory broadens this approach by justifying tax exemption not just for specific items done by charities that the government might otherwise have to pay for, but rather to all sorts of "good things" done by charities that are not otherwise being done by the private market or government directly or which differ in some significant way from similar services provided by the market or government. 109 Several theories of exemption (the "contract failure" 117 So, for example, Atkinson has an extremely broad conception of the proper role of exemption, extending it to any activity arguably funded in some way by altruism, while the traditional "quid pro quo" approach would limit exemption to activities that otherwise would be paid for by the government. But even the standard "quid pro quo" formula would extend exemption beyond poor relief to other activities a government might undertake in a civil society -education, for example, or public works-type activities such as parks. 118 Boris Bittker and George Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 307-16 (1976) (discussing how traditional income measurement theory under the IRC cannot be applied to nonprofit organizations and how calculating these organizations' net income would be difficult and complicated and confusing, and that taxing such income would in effect be a tax on the beneficiaries of the organization who are often too poor to pay tax themselves).
"tax base" explanation for exemption, any organization other than those engaged in regular commercial businesses that fit the normative definitions of "income," "deductions"
and so forth should be exempt; there is no reason, for example, to restrict exemption to disaster relief to the poor; and an organization that builds and maintains a city park used by everyone is just as deserving of exemption under this theory as the Salvation Army.
Finally, the adoption of a view of charity restricted to poor relief essentially is an adoption of one strand of distributive justice without full consideration of the implications of competing strands, or even without considering other potential theoretical measuring sticks, such as economic efficiency or pluralism. Professor Miranda Fleischer has covered this point in depth in a forthcoming article. 119 As she notes, existing theoretical scholarship on federal tax exemption (and the corresponding tax benefits, such as deductibility of donations and ability to issue tax-exempt bonds) fails to fully consider the distributive justice issues:
As a result of this desire to avoid value judgments, our theoretical understanding of what projects merit assistance under the charitable tax subsidies is wanting. The traditional subsidy theory demonstrates this most clearly. Although it focuses on the "good" things charities do for society, it contains standards which, standing alone, are too vague to be useful. To say that charities do "good" things that "benefit society" is meaningless without some conception of "the good." To say that charities should be subsidized because they relieve the government of burdens it would otherwise bear is largely meaningless without some sense of what e doing. To say that charities merit subsidy because they reative solutions to societies problems is similarly meaningless government should b provide diverse and c without a sense of what counts as a problem and which problems should be solved. Lastly, asserting that the altruistic nature of charitable giving merits a subsidy does not answer the question of whether all altruistic acts are equally worthy of a subsidy. The traditional subsidy theories are therefore too vague to adequately identify which projects merit a subsidy.
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As an example of her point, Fleischer offers the hypothetical case of a completelydonation-funded ketchup museum. 121 The question for her essentially is "what is it about a ketchup museum, even one funded by donations, that makes anyone think it deserves tax breaks?" In her view, the answer to this question should at least partially come from a rigorous analysis of distributive justice questions raised by giving tax breaks to the ketchup museum (and by implication, not to other potentially "worthy" causes depending on one's view of the distributive justice issues).
With respect to the question addressed in this paper (e.g., providing tax benefits only, or disproportionately, to charities that redistribute to the poor), Fleischer notes that such a policy implicates a "maxmin" version of welfarism, in which policy should be targeted toward helping the least advantaged in society. 122 But Fleischer notes that there are many other distributive justice regimes that would produce vastly different results. For example, a version of utilitarianism based on general wealth redistribution would favor any charity that effects a downward distribution of wealth of any kind, not just a distribution to the poor. Hence this version of utilitarianism might justify tax benefits for museums whose patrons are disproportionately middle-class but whose funding comes largely from the rich (and thus might also support middle-class housing in the Hamptons, despite current IRS hostility to that concept). 123 On the other hand, such a view would call into question tax breaks for any charity in which the beneficiaries were of similar economic status and hence only minimal wealth redistribution occurred -churches, for example. In contrast, a utilitarian vision that favored happiness over wealth might result fit framework. For example, many empirical studies have in a vastly different tax bene found a significant correlation between religious activity (church-going) and happiness.
This would suggest more tax benefits for churches. 124 The capability approach to consequentialism championed by Amarta Sen and Martha Nussbaum would provide yet a different answer to the scope of exemption/deduction, as would various strands of egaltarianism.
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For purposes of this paper, my point is not to try to argue in favor of one specific version of distributive justice. Rather, the point is that a conception of charity as "poor relief" unwittingly adopts one version of distributive justice (essentially the maxmin version) without adequately considering the implications, particularly the fact that many other theories of distributive justice would support far broader definitions of charity.
IV. Conclusion
A conception of charity for federal tax exemption purposes that is limited to poor relief is contrary to history, to the IRS's own regulations, and to every theory set forth so far to explain exemption. Such a view also unwittingly adopts a particular formulation of distributive justice without thoroughly examining competing views of distributive justice or even competing theoretical concerns such as economic efficiency.
Nevertheless, the probable explanation for the rise of the redistributionist view is that in a world where charities increasingly resemble for-profit businesses, policy makers need some sort of bright line to distinguish those organizations that have a proper claim to exemption from those that do not. "Helping the poor" is such a long-standing part of the core conception of charity that one can hardly blame policy makers for gravitating toward it as the bright line in question. The bulk of tax theory on exemption and legal philosophy, however, does not support such a narrow view of charity. Nevertheless, until we adopt some coherent rationale for exemption that provides better guidance for determining what activities are eligible for charitable tax benefits, we can expect problems exemption, even at the core, to continue. of interpreting the scope of 124 Id. (manuscript at 42). 125 Id. (manuscript at 44-48).
